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We investigate an international monetary business-cycle model in which a-
gents face monetary policy processes that incorporate regime shifts. In any
given period agents cannot directly observe the policy regime, but instead
form beliefs that are updated via Bayesian learning. As a result, expectation
adjustment displays inertia that adds persistence to the e®ects of monetary
shocks. Monetary policy process for the U.S. and an aggregate of OECD
countries are estimated using Hamilton's Markov-switching model. We then
solve and calibrate a version of the model and examine its quantitative prop-
erties.1 Introduction
This paper examines an international monetary business-cycle model in which
agents face monetary policy processes that incorporate regime shifts. Mon-
etary policy regimes switch over time according to a Markov transition law.
Actual money growth in any period depends both on the regime of a coun-
try's monetary authority and a monetary control error. In any given period
agents cannot directly observe the regime from which money growth rates
are drawn. Instead, beliefs are formed about the regime. These beliefs are
rational expectations of the money growth process. They are formed from
observed money growth rates and are updated using Bayesian learning. Our
use of regime switching and Bayesian learning closely follows Andolfatto and
Gomme [1], who analyzed a closed economy model of the Canadian economy.
Our model is also closely related to recent work by Moran [9, 10], who traces
out welfare costs of disin°ations in models with Bayesian learning.
We consider monetary regime switching because it appears that in many
industrialized countries central bankers do shift periodically between distinct
episodes of high and low average rates of money growth. Parameters of the
regime switching process are tied down using maximum likelihood estimation
of Hamilton's [7] Markov-switching model applied to U.S. and an aggregate
of OECD country money growth rates. Our estimates provide evidence that
regime switches do occur in the money growth data.
We employ a Bayesian learning mechanism to allow for inertia in the
updating of expectations about money growth rates and in°ation rates. This
inertia may be helpful in explaining observed persistence in the e®ects of
monetary innovations on, among other variables, interest and exchange rates,
and in explaining exchange rate variability (see Schlagenhauf and Wrase [13,
14] or Eichenbaum and Evans [6]). Our model has rational expectations
that display inertia. The rigidity arises endogenously as Bayesian learners
update their beliefs about monetary policy regimes. The learning mechanism
provides an avenue for investigating exchange rate variability that stands in
contrast to models of sticky prices, where unexplained price rigidities are
imposed exogenously ( see Obstfeld and Rogo® [11, 12], Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan [3], and Betts and Devereaux [2]). Learning about monetary
regimes has also been used to address features of exchange rate behavior other
than persistence, as the survey paper by Lewis [8], and references therein,
clearly articulates.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents some statistical prop-
1erties of international data, against which quantitative implications of the
model we construct can be compared. Section 3 presents an open econo-
my liquidity model in which agents form beliefs about monetary policy. The
quantitative properties of a parameterized version of the model are examined
in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Statistical Properties of International Data
Table 1 presents international data features against which we will evaluate the
models developed in subsequent sections. Moments in the table are Hodrick-
Prescott-¯ltered quarterly observations of exchange rates and outputs for six
major industrialized countries for various sample periods of °exible exchange
rates. The nominal exchange rate for each country is the bilateral exchange
rate vis-µ a-vis the U.S. dollar. Real exchange rates are measured using nom-
inal exchange rates and the consumer price indexes of individual countries.
Foreign data are from the OECD's Quarterly National Accounts and the
International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics.
The empirical regularities evident in Table 1 are that exchange rates,
nominal and real, are highly volatile with persistent movements. High per-
sistence is indicated by ¯rst-order autocorrelation coe±cients of, on average,
about 0.85 across most countries and sample periods. On the quantity side,
averaging across countries for the full sample period 1974:1-1994:2, the ¯rst-
order autocorrelations are .79 for GDP.
Averaging across countries in the full sample period, the standard devia-
tions of nominal and real exchange rates are close to ¯ve times higher than
the standard deviation of output. Variabilities in exchange rate are highest
in the 1980:1-1987:4 period, during which the U.S. dollar experienced a large
appreciation and subsequent depreciation. However, even when that peri-
od is removed from consideration, standard deviations of exchange rates are
high relative to standard deviations of output. Exchange rates are clearly
much more variable than the output measures, except for Canada.
One quantitative issue to be addressed is whether movements in exchange
rates drawn from simulations of our model are as persistent and highly
volatile as in the actual data. A second issue is whether the dynamic re-
sponses of exchange rates, interest rates, and real variables to monetary
shocks implied by our model correspond to impulse responses in actual da-
ta. A number of recent studies, such as Schlagenhauf and Wrase [13, 14]
2and Eichenbaum and Evans [6], have looked at the e®ects of monetary pol-
icy shocks on international variables using estimated vector autoregression
(VAR) data representations. There are four key features of the empirical
¯ndings: (i) A negative shock to U.S. monetary policy (positive shock to the
federal funds rate) is associated with persistent nominal and real appreci-
ations of the U.S. dollar vis-µ a-vis currencies of OECD countries, including
Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the U.K.; (ii) Responses of U.S. and
foreign interest rates, outputs, and nominal and real exchange rates to a
U.S. monetary policy shock all persist for many quarters beyond the period
of the shock; (iii) A negative U.S. monetary shock is associated with impact
increases in foreign interest rates, except for Japan, which implies a widening
of the U.S.-foreign interest rate di®erentials; and (iv) A negative U.S. mon-
etary shock is associated with an impact increase in U.S. output, increased
U.S. output for a few quarters after the shock, and subsequent output de-
creases. Foreign output responses to U.S. money shocks are much smaller
than the U.S. output response.
The above features of the responses of international variables to a nega-
tive shock to U.S. monetary policy (positive federal funds rate shock ) are the
main empirical regularities against which the model in this paper is evaluat-
ed. We consider whether a parameterized version of the model can account
for contemporaneous nominal and real U.S. currency appreciations, contem-
poraneous foreign interest rate increases, and contemporaneous increases in
U.S.-foreign interest rate di®erentials in response to a negative U.S. money
shock. We also consider whether agents' beliefs about monetary policy can
help account for e®ects of U.S. money shocks on exchange rates, interest
rates, and output across countries that persist well beyond the period of the
shock.1
3 An Open Economy Monetary Model with
Learning
This section presents an open economy monetary model in which money is
nonneutral. The nonneutrality arises from a limited participation feature:
households make portfolio decisions prior to observing money shocks while
¯rms make investment and hiring decisions after observing money shocks.
The model economy has two countries, domestic and foreign, linked by trade
3in goods and currencies. A multi-member household inhabits each country.
Households consist of shoppers, ¯rm managers, workers, and ¯nancial inter-
mediaries. Each household member has distinct tasks to perform during a
period in markets for goods, labor, and ¯nancial services. At the end of
each period, all household members reunite to pool resources. Thus, all of a
country's per household wealth resides with a representative household.
3.1 Trading Opportunities
The trading opportunities, objectives, and constraints of households are as-
sumed to be isomorphic across countries. For brevity, we provide details
for the representative domestic household's decisions and opportunities on-
ly. The foreign analogs are straightforward and involve obvious notational
alterations. The representative domestic household begins period t with KD
t
units of capital and AD
t units of domestic currency carried forward from the
previous period.2 At the beginning of period t, the domestic household di-
vides nominal wealth AD
t by sending a deposit of ND
t currency units with
its ¯nancial intermediary member to the domestic ¯nancial market. The re-
maining AD
t ¡ND
t is allocated to trade in the currency exchange market. In
the exchange market, domestic and foreign households trade currencies to
arrange balances for use in purchasing consumption goods.
Domestic currency available to the domestic household in the exchange
market consists of AD
t ¡ ND
t , from the initial wealth allocation, along with
the household worker's wages. The worker supplies ~ HD
t labor units in the
domestic labor market at nominal wage W D





t units of domestic currency are divided into a domestic
currency balance, MD
D;t, and a foreign currency balance, MD
F;t, at nominal
exchange rate et (expressed in domestic per foreign currency units). Note
that we allow for some of the household worker's wage receipts, $0W D
t ~ HD
t ,
with 0 · $0 · 1, to be used in currency trades in the foreign exchange















The household shopper purchases CD
D;t units of home-produced goods at price
PD
t , and CD
F;t units of foreign goods at price PF
















When the constraints bind as equalities, the shopper and worker combine to
return home at the end of the period with goods, but no cash.3
The ¯nancial intermediary receives a monetary injection XD
t in the ¯nan-
cial market, which is deposited on behalf of the household. The intermediary
then holds ND
t +XD
t units of cash, which it lends to domestic ¯rms. Loanable








The ¯rm manager hires workers, undertakes investment, and holds the house-
hold's capital stock KD
t . Prior to producing output, the ¯rm borrows LD
t
domestic currency units from an intermediary to ¯nance acquisition of HD
t
units of labor at wage W D
t per unit and to potentially ¯nance capital accu-












The ¯rm purchases ID
t = KD
t+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)KD
t units of home-produced goods
to add to the household's capital stock and ¯nances a fraction $1P D
t ID
t ,
with 0 · $1 · 1, representing the fraction of investment ¯nanced by loans.
Capital and consumption goods are indistinguishable in the domestic goods
market and sell at common price P D
t .
Determining the household's nominal wealth evolution requires account-
ing for currency brought home at the end of the period by household mem-
bers. From (1) - (3), the shopper and worker bring home goods but no cash
when the constraints bind as equalities. The ¯rm manager, after the close
of trading in goods markets, pays loan obligation RD
L;tLD
t , where RD
L;t is the
















t is real output per domestic household.






pays a gross deposit return RD
D;t(ND
t +XD
t ). The intermediary returns home



















5Combining cash brought home by the household ¯rm manager in (6), in-
termediary in (7), and cash that the household worker did not send to the


























3.2 Preferences, Technology, and Shocks










with 0;¯D < 1. Domestic consumption of home-produced goods, CD
D;t, and
foreign-produced goods, CD
































t = 1¡ ~ HD
t ; with the time endowment normalized to unity. For-
eign utility is the same as (9)-(11) except for obvious notational alterations.

















with 0 < ®D < 1. Foreign ¯rms' technologies are the same as above except
for notation.









s;t are per own-country-household stocks of










s;t depend on the monetary regimes generating monetary
policy. We now turn to the nature of monetary policy.
63.3 Monetary Policy and Beliefs
The money growth rates are assumed to be independent across the two coun-
tries. The autoregressive process followed by the domestic and foreign coun-
tries are then given by:
(X
D
t ¡ ¹ X
D
t ) = ª
D(X
D







t ¡ ¹ X
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t ) = ª
F(X
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L < ¹ X
j
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where ¹ XD and ¹ XF represent the long-term rate of money expansion in the
domestic and foreign country, respectively. The long-term money expansion
rate depends on which monetary policy regime is in place in a country.
Monetary policy regimes switch over time in the two countries according
to the transition law:
p
D
ij = Pr[ ¹ X
D
t = ¹ X
D
j j ¹ X
D





ij = Pr[ ¹ X
F
t = ¹ X
F
j j ¹ X
F
t¡1 = ¹ X
F
i ]
Agents in the economy know the parameters of the transition laws. The sense
in which X
j





H;H being close to one. Innovations eD
t and eF
t represent serially
independent monetary control errors. These control errors are independent
of labor productivity innovations and are drawn from normal distribution
functions N(0;¾j
a) for countries j = D;F and regimes a = L;H:
We assume that agents cannot directly observe the current and past mon-
etary policy regimes. Instead, they form beliefs based on the known param-
eters of the process governing monetary growth rates and on current and







of exposition, take the case of a single country and let bt denote the be-
lief that the current regime is characterized by low money growth. Thus,
bt = Prob( ¹ Xt = ¹ XL). The money supply process is given by:
(Xt ¡ ¹ Xt) = ª(Xt¡1 ¡ ¹ Xt¡1) + ²t





gl = bt¡1 ¤ pll ¤ fll(²
ll
t ) + (1 ¡ bt¡1) ¤ phl ¤ fhl(²
hl
t )
gh = bt¡1 ¤ plh ¤ flh(²
lh





t is the innovation implied by the money growth process under the
assumption that the regime was i last period and is j this period and fij(¢)
is the normal pdf for ²
ij
t .
Given this belief structure, money growth expectations and in°ation ex-
pectations could adjust sluggishly, depending on parameter values. For ex-
ample, if agents have been operating in a high money growth regime in a
given country and there is suddenly a switch to the low growth regime, it
may take a long string of relatively low money growth observations to appre-
ciably alter the probability agents assign to actually being in the low growth
regime. Such sluggishness in expectations in the face of changes in policy
regimes will in°uence the economic outcomes of policies such as a disin°a-
tion planned by a less-than-fully-credible monetary authority. With sluggish
expectations, it may take a prolonged period for nominal interest rates to
fully adjust to a planned disin°ation. Nominal rates will remain high until
the expected in°ation premium adjusts with beliefs. The extent to which
beliefs in°uence the economic outcomes of changes in money growth rates is
considered in our quantitative evaluation of the model. In that investigation,
we simulate the model using parameter values drawn from data on actual
outcomes in the U.S. and other major industrial countries.
While the illustration above was for the case of a single country, the exten-
sion to a two-country case is straightforward. The two-country economy has
four states: f(H;H);(H;L);(L;H);(L;L)g where (H;H) denotes domestic-
High, foreign-High, etc. Since we assume that the money supply processes
are independent across countries, transition probabilities between states can
be calculated as simple products of individual country transition probabili-
ties. The belief recursion is then an obvious extension of the two-state case
to a four-state case.
83.4 The Economy's State and Equilibrium



















t ) are the domestic (foreign) representative household's beginning cur-
rency and capital stocks. St denotes the vector of innovations to money
growth in the home and foreign country while bt denotes a vector of belief
probabilities over the four states of global monetary policy.
An equilibrium involves state-contingent prices, wages, interest and ex-
change rates, and optimal household decision rules satisfying market clear-
ing and aggregate consistency conditions. Market clearing conditions are:
~ HD
t = HD
t ; ~ HF
t = HF









for goods; ~ LD
t = LD
t ; ~ LF
t = LF




















3.5 Household Decisions and Qualitative Results
Since the choice problem facing domestic and foreign households is of the
same form, we focus on the domestic household's problem. The household
maximizes utility measure (9) subject to trading opportunities and con-
straints in (1)-(8), technology (12), and money-shock process (13)-(14).
Consider a case of full information, that is, a case in which households
and ¯rms have full knowledge of all current-period shocks prior to making
consumption and investment decisions. Let V D(AD
t ;KD
t ;St) be the value


























t+1 is given by wealth evolution (8). Binding cash constraints in (2)-(3), and
(5) are used to eliminate CD
D;t; CD
F;t; and HD
t as separate decisions. Also, from
the foreign exchange market allocation (1) we have AD
t ¡ND





F;t: Consequently, choice of MD
D;t is implied by choices of ND
t ,
9~ HD
t , and MD
F;t, since AD
t is predetermined and et and WD
t are taken by the







































t+1 + 1 ¡ ±D
¾






























L;t = 0 (20)
where ¹lD
t is the period t marginal utility of leisure, and the period t marginal





t . Condition (16), derived from the deposit choice, relates the nominal in-
terest rate, anticipated in°ation, and the household's intertemporal marginal
rate of substitution. Equation (17) governs the capital investment decision.
Equation (18) is derived from decisions about consumption and the domes-
tic and foreign currency balances to use in acquiring consumption goods.
Equation (19), derived from the work e®ort supply choice, equates the real
wage and intratemporal marginal rate of substitution between a consumption
quantity and leisure. Equation (20), from the ¯rm's loan demand decision,
equates labor's marginal product and the real cost of an additional labor u-
nit (real wage and interest cost of borrowing currency to hire labor). Beliefs
enter into the Euler equations by way of the integration over the transition
function ©(St+1 j St), i.e., by way of the expectations.
Note that if agents made their cash allocation decisions after observ-
ing money shocks, they will adjust amounts they send to the ¯nancial and
goods markets. As a result, nominal interest rates depend only on Fisherian
fundamentals{the real rate and expected in°ation. However, a positive shock
10to money growth in a country will increase expected in°ation, and with a
relatively small e®ect on the real rate, the nominal interest rate will rise.
If the nominal interest rate rises, borrowing costs of ¯rms will rise, leading
to reduced employment and output. These responses of interest rates and
output to a positive money shock run counter to conventional wisdom and to
evidence from VAR impulse responses functions. Consequently, we consider
an environment in which agents choose their allocation of currency between
shopping balances and balances to exchange in the foreign exchange market
prior to observing contemporaneous money shocks.
When cash allocation decisions are made before observing money shocks,
a liquidity e®ect, along with Fisherian fundamentals, helps determine nom-
inal interest rates. Recall that ¯nancial intermediaries are the recipients of
monetary injections in each country. Since households cannot adjust their
portfolios after a money shock hits, intermediaries, °ush with cash, will in-
duce ¯rms to borrow and disproportionately absorb any money injection
through lower nominal interest rates. If nominal rates end up lower in equi-
librium, employment will increase since the cost of borrowing to hire labor
has fallen. The equilibrium outcome for interest rates and real activities de-
pends on the relative strengths of the anticipated in°ation e®ect and liquidity
e®ect. As Christiano [4, 5] shows in a closed economy, and Shlagenhauf and
Wrase [13, 14] show in an open economy, the liquidity e®ect can dominate in
a version of the model with empirically plausible parameter values. However,
the liquidity e®ect lacks persistence. The cash allocation rigidity that gives
rise to the liquidity e®ect vanishes in the period following a money shock
and consequently, so, too, do most of the e®ects of the shock. Our interest
here is to examine how sluggishness of expectations that arise from monetary
regime switching and Bayesian updating of beliefs about monetary regimes
a®ects the dynamics of the liquidity e®ect and the dynamics of nominal and
real exchange rate responses to monetary innovations.
4 Quantitative Results
The model is solved, parameterized, and simulated to evaluate its quantita-
tive implications. Solving the model involves combining domestic and foreign
Euler equations with equilibrium and aggregate-consistency conditions. S-
ince closed-form solutions cannot be obtained, given the nonlinear nature of
the model, we solve the model using the method of undetermined coe±cients
11in Christiano [4]. The procedure involves: (i) transforming variables to in-
duce stationarity; (ii) linearizing optimality conditions by taking a ¯rst-order
Taylor approximation about the nonstochastic steady state and imposing e-
quilibrium and aggregate consistency conditions; (iii) conjecturing recursive
laws of motion for choice variables that are linear in the state variables;
and (iv) determining coe±cient values for the linear decision rules using the
method of undetermined coe±cients.
Values of parameters ½j;vj;¯j;°j;®j;±j; for j = D;F, and parameters
of the shock process that we use in simulations are summarized in Table 2.
½D and ½F, which determine curvatures of period utility functions, are each
set to -1. The share vD (vF) of domestic (foreign) goods in the domestic
(foreign) household's Cobb-Douglas consumption composite is set to 0.5, a
value used in a number of recent studies, including Stockman and Tesar [15]
and Schlagenhauf and Wrase [13, 14]. Leisure shares in momentary utility for
both countries are set to °D = °F = 0:76, which, together with the model's
other parameter values, implies a steady-state allocation in each country
of roughly 26 percent of nonsleep time to market activity. Discount rates
¯D and ¯F are set to 0.99, which implies a nonstochastic steady-state real
interest rate of 1 percent per quarter in each country, close to the average
return on capital over the last century in the U.S.
The production technologies we use have Cobb-Douglas capital-labor sub-
stitution. Labor's share for both countries is set to 1¡®D = (1¡®F) = 0:64,
standard values in closed-economy real-business-cycle models, and values
consistent with postwar U.S. data. Capital depreciation rates ±D and ±Fare
each set to 0.025, implying annual depreciation of 10 percent, close to the
average depreciation rate for the U.S. over the period 1972:1-1997:4.
The stochastic processes governing money growth shocks in the two coun-
tries are in (13) and (14). Values for the parameters in the money growth
processes are maximum likelihood estimates obtained using Hamilton's [7]
regime-switching model and data on growth rates of the per capita mon-
etary base for the U.S. and nine major OECD countries (Austria, Cana-
da, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, and the United
Kingdom).5 The foreign countries were aggregated to represent the foreign
country of the model. Speci¯cally, a monetary base variable was constructed
using monetary data from each country converted into U.K. pounds using
average 1980 exchange rates. Exchange rates are held constant so that the
foreign money measure re°ects changes in the monetary base only. From
our estimates over the period 1972:1-1997:4, estimated values for the money
12growth regime processes are given in Table 2.
4.1 Transitory Money Shocks
The ¯rst quantitative exercise performed is an analysis of the responses of
model variables to a temporary (one period) one-standard-deviation increase
in domestic (U.S.) money growth. Both countries are assumed to have been
in a low money growth regime for a long time (long enough so that beliefs
settle down) when the shock occurs. Figure 1 shows the evolution of beliefs
for the home country remaining in a low growth regime. While in the period
of the shock there is a signi¯cant assignment of probability to the possibility
that the home country has shifted to high growth, the belief quickly falls back
as subsequent money growth realizations are consistent with a continuation
of the low growth environment.
Figure 2 plots the response of some domestic variables and exchange rates
to the transitory shock. The model is parameterized so that workers send
none of their wage receipts to the foreign exchange market ($0 = 0) and all
of the ¯rm's investment is funded by borrowing ($1 = 1). Impulse responses
are generated under two di®erent information assumptions. The plot labeled
full info is for the case where monetary policy is completely credible so that
agents have no uncertainty about the true state of the monetary regime. The
plot labeled uncertainty is for the case where agents are uncertain about the
true monetary regime and thus form beliefs about it. For both cases it is
assumed that household portfolio decisions are made prior to observing the
period's money shock.
As Figure 2 shows, the model generates dominant liquidity e®ects with
the domestic nominal interest rate declining and output growth rising in
the face of an easing of U.S. monetary policy. The model also generates
depreciations in real and nominal exchange rates. Note, though, that because
of the sluggish household portfolio decision assumption, the exchange rate
does not depreciate immediately (in the period of the shock) but instead
responds one period after the monetary shock.
Following the period of the temporary shock, anticipated in°ation e®ects
dominate in determining nominal interest rates. Of particular interest are
the responses of nominal interest rates and exchange rates following the pe-
riod of the shock. Note that the full information responses are quantitatively
smaller after the shock relative to the uncertainty responses. This re°ect-
s the informational assumption that fully informed agents know there has
13simply been a transitory domestic monetary easing and there will be no lin-
gering in°ation, so that their in°ation expectations are muted relative to the
uncertain agents. If households are uncertain about the true state of mone-
tary policy when a positive monetary shock hits, they will attach increased
probability to the possibility that the regime is high growth. As a result, in
the next period, they send less cash to ¯nancial intermediaries than if they
knew the regime remained low growth (they expect somewhat higher mon-
ey growth). When the expected monetary injection is not realized, there is
a liquidity "shortage," resulting in nominal interest rates being bid up and
downward pressure on employment and output. The lingering anticipated
in°ation e®ect essentially accounts for the di®erences between the two plots
in each frame of the ¯gure. It is clear then that in models of this sort, persis-
tent liquidity e®ects will not be generated in response to transitory monetary
shocks. We will see though that persistence can be generated when shocks
are of a more permanent nature (i.e., regime shifts).
Figures 3 and 4 examine the case of a foreign transitory money growth
shock (one-standard-deviation increase) and its e®ect on U.S. nominal and
real variables. Both countries are assumed to have been in the low growth
regime for a su±cient period of time for beliefs to settle down when the shock
hits. Figure 3 is a plot of beliefs for a foreign transitory money shock. Given
our parameter estimates, the belief revision is much smaller in magnitude
than for the case of a domestic monetary shock. As before, beliefs show little
persistence, returning to their initial state after two to three periods.
Figure 4 plots the U.S. response to a foreign transitory shock. The foreign
money growth increase generates impact nominal and real appreciations of
the domestic currency, an increase in the domestic nominal interest rate,
and an impact decrease in domestic real output growth. Note that there is
virtually no di®erence in the paths for the full information case and for the
case with uncertainty about the monetary regime. This arises from the very
small e®ect that a foreign transitory shock has on beliefs about the state
of monetary policy (Figure 3). Note also that the overall e®ect of a foreign
shock on U.S. variables is very small and arises primarily from e®ects of
changes in expectations about foreign in°ation on domestic agents' choices.
4.2 Changes in Regime
To analyze a transition in monetary regimes, we perform the following exper-
iment. The economy begins in a global monetary state that has each country
14in a high money growth regime. We then transit one of the countries to a low
money growth regime and analyze the e®ects on model variables. The same
parameterization is used as in the transitory shock experiments ($0 = 0 and
$1 = 1).
Figure 5 shows the e®ect on beliefs when the home country (U.S.) un-
dertakes a permanent disin°ation. It takes approximately six quarters for
beliefs to fully adjust to the new monetary regime. Figure 6 plots the e®ect
of the disin°ation policy on domestic variables. There is a dominant liquidity
e®ect on the nominal interest rate and output growth increases on impact.
Note that there is increased persistence in the uncertainty case relative to
the certainty case. In the case of output growth, it takes about ¯ve quar-
ters for output growth to settle down when agents are uncertain about the
monetary regime. This compares to about three quarters for the certainty
case. However, the absolute di®erence between the two paths is rather small.
Similarly for the nominal exchange rate. Regime uncertainty adds three to
four quarters of persistence to the interest rate response compared to the
certainty case, but the di®erence between the two paths is somewhat less
than 1 percent (at a quarterly rate) at its maximum. The nominal exchange
rate appreciates (with a one-period lag) in response to the disin°ation. Some
persistence is generated by regime uncertainty relative to the certainty case.
The real exchange rate appreciates on impact, then depreciates as output
growth and in°ation settle down.
Why does uncertainty about the monetary regime generate persistence
in the case of a regime switch? Suppose the economy has been in a high
growth regime for some time. Households send an amount to the ¯nancial
intermediary consistent with their expectation that money growth will be
high. If the regime switches to low growth, intermediaries initially ¯nd they
are short on liquidity, which puts upward pressure on the nominal interest
rate. Next period, households revise their beliefs, putting increased weight on
the possibility that the regime has switched. However, they are not yet fully
convinced and so place less funds with the ¯nancial intermediary than they
would if they knew with certainty that the regime was low growth. Again, a
low money growth realization comes in, banks are short on liquidity, there is
upward pressure on nominal rates relative to the full information case. This
upward pressure on nominal rates in a period continues until households
attach the appropriate probability to the low growth regime outcome and
send the appropriate amount of funds to the ¯nancial intermediary.
Figure 7 plots beliefs for an experiment in which the foreign country
15undertakes a disin°ation policy while the home country stays in a high growth
regime. Given our estimates on the money supply process, the adjustment of
beliefs for this case is much more rapid than in the case of a U.S. disin°ation
policy. Here, beliefs have fully adjusted after about three quarters.
Figure 8 shows domestic variable responses to a foreign monetary regime
switch from a high to a low growth regime. There do not appear to be signif-
icant di®erences in domestic in°ation, interest rate, or output e®ects across
the full information and the uncertainty economies. The signi¯cant di®er-
ences show up in exchange rate responses. For the nominal exchange rate,
the fully informed agents ratchet nominal exchange rates down almost imme-
diately to the new stationary level, as displayed by the almost immediate and
permanent domestic nominal appreciation. The real exchange rate initially
appreciates, followed by some protracted real depreciation. For both the
nominal and real exchange rates, there are clear and signi¯cant di®erences
in the adjustments across the full information and uncertainty economies,
re°ecting di®erent expected in°ation paths across the two economies.
5 Conclusion
We have constructed, solved, and simulated an open economy monetary mod-
el in which agents do not know with certainty the true state of monetary
policy. Agents form beliefs based on observed money growth rates, but they
cannot disentangle monetary control errors from mean shifts. Our interest
is in whether a calibrated version of the model can help account for the ob-
served persistent e®ects of monetary innovations on key economic variables.
Calibrating the money supply processes required us to estimate Hamilton's
regime-switching models for money growth processes for the U.S. and an
aggregate of nine major OECD countries. The model provides evidence for
additional persistence in e®ects on key variables of monetary innovations
when regime switching and learning about regimes are included. However,
the overall e®ect on persistence is small under our calibration.
The model suggests that some of the observed persistence the data dis-
play in response to monetary policy shocks can be accounted for by sticky
expectations generated by learning. For the parameterization considered in
this paper, learning introduces quantitatively signi¯cant e®ects: the di®er-
ences in magnitude of response between the full information and uncertainty
cases were noticeable as was the amount of persistence generated in response
16to monetary shocks. The next step we are pursuing is to determine how
sensitive our results are to alternative con¯gurations of parameters in the
model.
17ENDNOTES
1. In the models there is no distinction between the terms of trade and
the real exchange rate. Moments for the two international relative
price measures are provided in Table 1 to illustrate that, in general,
using alternative measures, international relative prices possess high
volatilities.
2. The notational conventions are: A subscript denotes the country of o-
rigin of a good or money balance. A superscript denotes the residence
of the household choosing the variable. A tilde "~" denotes a quan-
tity supplied; household choice variables without tildes are quantities
demanded.
3. In simulations, parameter values are used for which agents drive cash
constraints to bind as strict equalities. That is, the gross nominal
interest rates exceed unity.
4. As long as the gross loan rate exceeds unity, intermediaries lend all
available cash to ¯rms.
5. Ideally, monetary base data would be an appropriate proxy to use as
a correspondence to the monetary process controlled by a monetary
authority in the model. The closest analog in the IFS database is
"reserve money," which we found to contain too many data entry errors
to be reliable. The monetary series for foreign countries that we use is
the series "money," line 34 in the IFS database, which is composed of
transferable deposits and currency outside banks. This is the closest
reliable data analog to what the foreign monetary authorities actually
control that we have found.
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20Table 1: Exchange Rate Volatility and Persistence
Standard Deviation Autocorrelation
Country Sample Period Nom FX Real FX Real output Nom FX Real FX
Canada 1973:1-1992:1 2.693 2.876 2.227 0.832 0.837
1973:1-1979:4 2.863 2.745 1.658 0.838 0.817
1980:1-1987:4 2.712 3.292 3.281 0.880 0.883
1988:1-1992:1 1.942 2.071 1.954 0.457 0.422
France 1973:1-1992:1 9.587 8.867 0.940 0.870 0.851
1973:1-1979:4 7.213 6.645 1.092 0.723 0.705
1980:1-1987:4 12.395 11.349 0.738 0.872 0.852
1988:1-1992:1 7.085 6.984 0.914 0.568 0.563
Germany 1973:1-1992:1 9.327 8.921 1.433 0.841 0.826
1973:1-1979:4 7.415 7.191 1.827 0.663 0.649
1980:1-1987:4 11.694 11.072 1.329 0.844 0.831
1988:1-1992:1 7.318 6.995 0.796 0.548 0.525
Japan 1973:1-1992:1 9.372 9.333 1.073 0.859 0.851
1973:1-1979:4 9.286 8.954 1.472 0.866 0.843
1980:1-1987:4 9.7315 9.815 0.787 0.822 0.807
1988:1-1992:1 9.029 8.913 0.701 0.745 0.738
UK 1973:1-1992:1 9.179 8.867 1.699 0.852 0.850
1973:1-1979:4 8.241 6.645 1.960 0.836 0.706
1980:1-1987:4 10.871 11.348 1.018 0.846 0.852
1988:1-1992:1 7.020 6.984 1.945 0.606 0.563
USA 1973:1-1992:1 { { 1.879 { {
1973:1-1979:4 { { 2.171 { {
1980:1-1987:4 { { 1.711 { {
1988:1-1992:1 { { 1.522 { {
These statistics are for Hodrick-Prescott ¯ltered quarterly data over the sam-
ple periods listed. The nominal exchange rate for each country is the bilateral
exchange rate vis-µ a-vis the US dollar. Real exchange rates are measured using
the nominal exchange rates and individual country consumer price indexes.
Data are from the International Monetary Fund's International Financial
Statistics.
21Table 2: Calibration Parameters
Preference and Technology Parameters
º home good share in consumption 0.5
½ utility curvature -1.0
¯ discount factor 0.99
° leisure share in utility 0.76
® capital share in technology 0.36
± depreciation 0.025
Money Supply Process Parameters




H High-growth regime means .0182 .0333
(.0073) (.0019)
¹ XD
L ; ¹ XF












H high-growth regime standard deviation .00386 .1332
¾D
L ;¾F
L low-growth regime standard deviation .00358 .00838
22Figure 1: Change in beliefs in response to 1 standard deviation transitory
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26Figure 3: Change in beliefs in response to 1 standard deviation transitory
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